Simple Adaptive Strategies: From Regret-matching To Uncoupled Dynamics

This book compiles extensive research on game dynamics and equilibria, highlighting the role of regret-matching and its implications for various fields.

The book Simple Adaptive Strategies: From Regret-matching To Uncoupled Dynamics presents nearly two decades of collaborative research by Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell, focusing on the intricate dynamics of game theory and equilibria. The authors introduce the concept of regret-matching, an adaptive strategy that is both intuitive and effective, ultimately leading to correlated equilibria. This foundational insight into boundedly rational behavior reveals how simple strategies can yield rational outcomes over time, paving the way for extensive exploration into the dynamics of adaptive strategies.

A key aspect discussed in Simple Adaptive Strategies is the concept of uncoupledness, where decision-makers operate without knowledge of each other's payoffs and utilities. This condition significantly restricts the types of equilibria that can be achieved, offering a fascinating perspective on strategic interactions. The authors also draw intriguing connections to fields such as behavioral and neurobiological sciences, as well as computer science and engineering, particularly through the lens of regret.

The book is designed to be self-contained and cohesive, balancing formal treatments of concepts, theorems, and proofs with accessible explanations and practical examples. It serves as an excellent resource for advanced graduate courses in game theory, economics, mathematics, computer science, and engineering, while also providing a solid foundation for ongoing research in these areas.