Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

In presenting a historical overview of Quine’s philosophical response to Lewis’ conceptual pragmatism, Sinclair offers a fresh perspective on the interplay between pragmatism and analytic philosophy in the mid-twentieth century. This work broadens our knowledge about Quine’s development, deepens our understanding of his objections to the analytic-synthetic distinction, and sheds new light on his naturalized epistemology. Sinclair’s book, in sum, is a must read for all Quine scholars and a valuable recourse for historians of analytic philosophy.

-- Sander Verhaegh, Tilburg University

In Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, Robert Sinclair traces the often underappreciated influence of C.I. Lewis and his conceptual pragmatism on Quine’s early development. Starting with his graduate work, Sinclair details Quine’s growing discomfort with Lewis’s reliance on both the analytic-synthetic distinction and phenomenalism. While Quine was at first hopeful about analyticity, Sinclair shows how the exchanges with Lewis and Quine’s commitment to Lewis’s own style of pragmatism contribute to Quine’s rejection of the epistemological significance of the analytic-synthetic distinction and to his eventual move to naturalized epistemology. Emphasizing Lewis’s influence clarifies Quine’s claim to a more thorough pragmatism by taking us beyond just the typical focus on Carnap’s role. Further, tracing continuities between Lewis and Quine, Sinclair sheds useful light on the genesis and structure of Quine’s mature naturalism. Writing with clarity and a deft command of primary and secondary literature, Sinclair deepens and broadens our perspective on Quine’s development and a crucial period in the history of analytic philosophy.

-- Paul Gregory, Washington and Lee Univer