From Hitler's Germany to Saddam's Iraq

An incisive and important new book. . . . [Silverstone] provides an important and necessary model for thinking about the costs and benefits of any given military action. Given the disastrous experience of the Iraq war, we would do well to remind future preventive war hawks (of which there will inevitably be many), whether we’re dealing with a nuclear Iran or a rising China, of the history of preventive war’s false prophecy. * The American Conservative *
This is a powerful and provocative critique of the temptation to engage in preventive war against potential enemies. Whether you agree or disagree with Silverstone's conclusions, you will benefit from his deep knowledge of history and his reminder to remain humble about one's ability to predict the long-term outcome of the use of military force. -- Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University
At the very top of the list of political catastrophes and devastating wars that we wish could have been prevented is the Nazi domination of Europe and World War II. In this enlightening and deeply researched study, Scott Silverstone describes just how difficult—indeed, nearly impossible—that would have been. And in that tragic story are profound lessons for the difficulty of nearly all successful acts of preventive war. -- Michael Doyle, author of Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International Conflict
The obvious lesson of the 1930s is that leaders should eliminate gathering threats before they mature. To the contrary, Scott Silverstone’s careful reexamination of this and other cases shows that preventive war, although tempting, usually is a trap. The preventive war paradox is that while such a war can succeed tactically, it may fail to secure a lasting peace. Humility, patience, and the understanding that there are few silver bullets in international politics are better guidelines. -- Robert Jervis, author of How Statesmen Think
Silverstone provides a timely critique of strategies of preventive war. His historically rich analysis of the 1930s is complemented by illuminating comparisons with ancient Greece and Rome and the contemporary era. He shows that short-term military success against rising powers often increases long-term strategic threats rather than eliminates them. Silverstone’s well-written book is essential reading for international relations theorists, diplomatic historians, policy makers, and others concerned with international peace and security in a changing and uncertain world. -- Jack S. Levy, Rutgers University