Freedom, Teleology, and Evil

"'Goetz's book Freedom, Teleology, and Evil is highly original and, indeed, unique in that it is a systematic defense of a non-causal approach to agency, including free will and moral responsibility. The critical arguments are probing, and Goetz's positive suggestions are provocative and important. I highly recommend this book.' (John Martin Fischer, Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside) 'Goetz's remarkable book Freedom, Teleology, and Evil fills a much-needed gap in the contemporary discussion of the metaphysics of human freedom. For many years, philosophers have noted the existence of logical space for a thoroughly noncausal libertarian theory, but generally dismissed the idea as unworthy of serious or sustained discussion. Such disdain will be hard to defend in the wake of Goetz's careful and detailed defense of one version of this view. His position is presented with great clarity and precision, and difficulties alleged to bedevil the theory are met head-on. The extension of the view into theological issues in the final chapter is also much to be applauded. Many libertarians (including this one) may still have reservations regarding the noncausal approach even after reading this impressive book, but few will (or at least should) still doubt that it is an option worthy of libertarians' most serious consideration.' (Thomas Flint, Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame) 'In Freedom, Teleology, and Evil, Stewart Goetz skillfully develops a highly significant position on free will and moral responsibility. His central claim is that free choices are uncaused, but at the same time explained teleologically by purposes or reasons. Goetz argues that this view is attractive and important for two central reasons: it accommodates the intuitions that count against the compatibility of free will and determinism, and it provides an answer to the main challenge to libertarian accounts of free will: that because actions are undetermined, whether they occur is a matter of luck, and the agent is therefore not responsible for them. This book will be valuable to anyone interested in the problem of free will, and especially to those attracted to exploring new possibilities for libertarian views of agency.' (Derk Pereboom, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University) "This book provides not only a sustained presentation of one non-causal libertarian view, but also a detailed engagement with objections to it, and an excellent introduction to a substantial body of the current literature on the topic of free will. It makes a significant contribution to that literature and would make an excellent text for a graduate seminar." (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews) "Both familiarizes readers with currant philosophical debates and provides a defense of an original theory with which they can profitably engage... a good choice for graduate seminars as well as scholars in the field." (Journal of Religious Studies)"