Organizing Leviathan

Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good Government

Carl Dahlström author Victor Lapuente author

Format:Paperback

Publisher:Cambridge University Press

Published:21st Jun '17

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Organizing Leviathan cover

This book explores the reasons behind varying levels of corruption and governance quality in different countries, emphasizing the importance of bureaucratic organization in Organizing Leviathan.

In Organizing Leviathan, this insightful work delves into the intricate relationship between governance, public policy, and public administration. It addresses a fundamental question: why do some countries exhibit lower levels of corruption and more effective governance than others? The author challenges conventional wisdom, asserting that the organization of bureaucracy plays a pivotal role in determining a nation's governance quality. By exploring long-term cultural and economic trends, along with the degree of democracy, the book presents a compelling argument for the significance of merit-based bureaucracies.

The text posits that countries where public bureaucracies are staffed by merit-recruited employees tend to perform better than those where appointments are influenced by political connections. This notion is supported by a robust theoretical framework that connects meritocratic structures to reduced corruption, enhanced government effectiveness, and increased adaptability to reform. The research is bolstered by a unique dataset encompassing the bureaucratic frameworks of over 100 nations, along with detailed case studies that highlight the dynamics between politicians and bureaucrats, particularly in Spain and Sweden.

Organizing Leviathan makes a notable contribution to the fields of comparative politics and public policy, offering fresh insights into the mechanics of good governance. Through its comprehensive analysis, the book sheds light on the critical factors that foster effective governance, making it an essential read for scholars and practitioners alike who seek to understand the complexities of public administration and corruption.

'In this impressive book, Dahlstrom and Lapuente think deeply about the organization of the state and the quality of government. They argue that a productive structuring of the relationship between politicians and civil servants minimizes corruption and inefficiency. They explore this relationship with terrific case examples and data on more than 100 countries around the world. It is a terrific example of research that carefully builds bridges across literatures to provide new insights on big questions.' David E. Lewis, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee
'Dahlstrom and Lapuente succeed in making the study of public bureaucracy central to future research in comparative politics and political economy. They provide considerable and compelling theoretical and empirical evidence for their claim that merit selection is even more important than rules and regulations in both constraining corruption and in improving policy and practice. Theirs is a significant contribution to understanding the variation in the performance of democratic governments. In this era of increasing anti-government populism, they provide hope that at least democracies will be able to continue to perform at high levels and according to the best scientific evidence available.' Margaret Levi, Stanford University, California

ISBN: 9781316630655

Dimensions: 227mm x 152mm x 15mm

Weight: 390g

270 pages