Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies

'Kosař … relies on more than 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts from 1993 to 2010 to analyze differing forms of accountability of the least accountable branch of government: the judiciary. The volume's first part lays the theoretical framework that informs the empirical analysis presented in chapters 4 to 7. It defines judicial accountability, describes its mechanisms, and overviews the role of judicial councils in insulating the judiciary from politics, enhancing its independence, and thus ensuring judicial accountability. Chapter 4 comments on the methodology of the empirical research, explaining case selection and case analysis, whereas chapters 5 to 7 compare cases from the Czech and Slovak Republics. The final chapter serves as a conclusion, arguing that the judicial council increases judicial autonomy without necessarily improving the independence of individual judges. Recommended.' L. Stan, Choice
'Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies serves as a fine cautionary tale about unforeseen consequences and about the perils of sloganizing the sophisticated semantics of constitutionalism and imposing top-down, ready-made policy solutions adopted on the basis of such slogans.' Bogdan Iancu, European Constitutional Law Review
'Kosař's thoroughly researched book is one of the most comprehensive accounts on judicial accountability written in comparative judicial scholarship, providing a solid basis for further discussions of this concept in academic circles. The book offers a springboard for future analyses on judicial accountability mechanisms and their operation, including their informal dimension, in the post-communist world and beyond.' Raul A. Sanches-Urribarri, I-CONnect (www.iconnectblog.com)