Ethical Sentimentalism

This volume provides the first comprehensive evaluation of 'sentimentalism' - one of the most dominant moral theories in philosophy today.

This volume examines the relationship between morality and emotion, a major topic in ethics today. In particular, the book explores 'ethical sentimentalism' - the theory that moral value and judgment depend on human emotions. It will be essential for philosophy students and researchers, and for those working in political theory and psychological sciences.In recent years there has been a tremendous resurgence of interest in ethical sentimentalism, a moral theory first articulated during the Scottish Enlightenment. Ethical Sentimentalism promises a conception of morality that is grounded in a realistic account of human psychology, which, correspondingly, acknowledges the central place of emotion in our moral lives. However, this promise has encountered its share of philosophical difficulties. Chief among them is the question of how to square the limited scope of human motivation and psychological mechanism - so easily influenced by personal, social, and cultural circumstance - with the seeming universal scope and objective nature of moral judgment. The essays in this volume provide a comprehensive evaluation of the sentimentalist project with a particular eye to this difficulty. Each essay offers critical clarification, innovative answers to central challenges, and new directions for ethical sentimentalism in general.