Leniency in Asian Competition Law

This volume provides an in-depth analysis of leniency programs in Asia, exploring their effectiveness and the responses from cartel participants. Leniency in Asian Competition Law is a crucial resource for understanding competition law in the region.

In Leniency in Asian Competition Law, scholars, policymakers, and practitioners come together to explore the emergence of leniency programs in Asia, a unique tool designed to combat cartel formation through competition law. This volume delves into the various forces that have influenced the development of these programs and examines how cartel participants are reacting to them. By providing a platform for firms to disclose their involvement in illegal cartel activities, leniency programs offer the possibility of reduced penalties or immunity from sanctions, encouraging cooperation with authorities.

The experimentation with leniency programs spans across nine Asian jurisdictions, showcasing a diverse landscape of approaches. This book highlights three main dimensions of this experimentation: the revision of previously established leniency programs, the introduction of newly crafted ones, and the choice to forgo creating a leniency program altogether. Each jurisdiction's experience contributes valuable insights into the effectiveness and adaptability of these mechanisms in addressing cartel behavior.

As the first empirical analysis of leniency programs in Asia, Leniency in Asian Competition Law presents a comprehensive examination of how these measures have evolved in response to challenges faced by competition lawyers and policymakers. Local and international experts contribute their knowledge, offering a thorough introduction to this rapidly developing area, and exploring the theoretical, international, and regulatory contexts surrounding leniency programs in the region.