Leniency in Asian Competition Law

The first empirical analysis of leniency programmes implemented in Asian countries to enforce the anti-cartel provisions of their competition law.

Scholars, policymakers and practitioners analyse the recent trend in Asia to experiment with leniency programmes, a tool unique to competition law to detect, punish and deter cartel formation. This volume explains what forces have shaped these programmes and how cartel participants are responding to them.In response to cartel formation, competition lawyers and policymakers in nine Asian jurisdictions have experimented with leniency programmes. This mechanism allows firms to come forward with information in relation to their illegal cartel participation in return for a reduction of or immunity from a sanction. The experimentation plays out across three different dimensions: the revision of early adopted leniency programmes, the introduction of newly written leniency programmes, and the decision – deliberate or otherwise – not to create a leniency programme. This volume is the first to analyse the empirical evidence across a number of countries to determine how effective these measures have been, and how they have been amended in response to problems encountered. In this volume, local experts from key Asian jurisdictions, together with international experts, offer an introduction to this fast-developing field, and explore the theoretical, international and regulatory contexts of leniency programmes.