Mathematics and Explanation

This Element questions the philosophical significance of mathematical explanations and whether they tell us about the nature of reality.

This Element discusses traditional theory of scientific explanation, its inadequacies, clarifications, and how to integrate mathematical elements into the physical world. Some of the evidence for a novel scientific posit may be traced to the explanatory power that this posit would afford, were it to exist.This Element answers four questions. Can any traditional theory of scientific explanation make sense of the place of mathematics in explanation? If traditional monist theories are inadequate, is there some way to develop a more flexible, but still monist, approach that will clarify how mathematics can help to explain? What sort of pluralism about explanation is best equipped to clarify how mathematics can help to explain in science and in mathematics itself? Finally, how can the mathematical elements of an explanation be integrated into the physical world? Some of the evidence for a novel scientific posit may be traced to the explanatory power that this posit would afford, were it to exist. Can a similar kind of explanatory evidence be provided for the existence of mathematical objects, and if not, why not?