Motivation and the Primacy of Perception

Bridging phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, Peter Antich asserts that the latter has long been hampered by an inadequate phenomenology of knowledge. However, a careful description of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenon of motivation can offer compelling new ways to think about knowledge and longstanding epistemological questions.

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological notion of motivation advances a compelling alternative to the empiricist and rationalist assumptions that underpin modern epistemology.

Arguing that knowledge is ultimately founded in perceptual experience, Peter Antich interprets and defends Merleau-Ponty’s thinking on motivation as the key to establishing a new form of epistemic grounding. Upending the classical dichotomy between reason and natural causality, justification and explanation, Antich shows how this epistemic ground enables Merleau-Ponty to offer a radically new account of knowledge and its relation to perception. In so doing, Antich demonstrates how and why Merleau-Ponty remains a vital resource for today’s epistemologists.