Why Science Needs Metaphysics

This book critiques the rise of subjectivism in epistemology, advocating for rational metaphysics as essential for scientific understanding. Why Science Needs Metaphysics explores these themes in depth.

In a time when postmodernism and deconstruction dominate academic discourse, scholars have increasingly sought to redefine epistemology as a subjectivist pursuit. Why Science Needs Metaphysics critiques this trend, arguing for a return to rational metaphysics and the foundational ideas of the Vienna Circle. This work emphasizes the importance of understanding the world as an objective reality, independent of individual perceptions and emotions.

The author, Zahar, provides a compelling case for rational metaphysics, building on and refining Karl Popper's theories regarding epistemological challenges. By extending Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific Research Programs, Zahar presents a new framework for understanding scientific inquiry and its philosophical underpinnings. The book serves as both a critique of contemporary philosophical thought and a robust defense of realism in science.

To illustrate the practical implications of his arguments, Why Science Needs Metaphysics concludes with two insightful case studies: one focusing on the evolution of atomic theory and the other on Einstein's philosophical contributions to science. These examples underscore the significance of realist metaphysics in the work of renowned scientists, reinforcing the notion that a solid metaphysical foundation is essential for scientific progress.