While Dangers Gather

This is the state-of-the-art book on the domestic and international politics of the use of military force abroad by U.S. presidents. It should be widely read for the depth and breadth of its scholarship, and for the importance of its topic. -- Bruce Russett, Yale University This is probably the best book yet on the domestic politics of American decisions to use military force. Through an astonishing array of empirical data, it presents convincing evidence that the history of American military action during the postwar era would have looked quite different without congressional restraints. The authors weave three bodies of research--political communication, executive-legislative politics, and the international relations literature on the use of force--into a single coherent, causal story, and their language is quite lucid and jargon-free. -- Benjamin O. Fordham, Binghamton University This is an important book that scholars will have to take seriously. The authors' persuasive assertions that Congress is a serious constraint on presidential power are bold and sure to ignite debate. While other scholars have begun to tread on the conventional wisdom, none have done such a comprehensive job in making the claim and supporting it with such a variety of evidence. -- Linda L. Fowler, Dartmouth College

Offers evidence on Congress' influence on presidential war powers. This book concludes that presidents are systematically less likely to exercise military force when their partisan opponents retain control of Congress.Nearly five hundred times in the past century, American presidents have deployed the nation's military abroad, on missions ranging from embassy evacuations to full-scale wars. The question of whether Congress has effectively limited the president's power to do so has generally met with a resounding "no." In While Dangers Gather, William Howell and Jon Pevehouse reach a very different conclusion. The authors--one an American politics scholar, the other an international relations scholar--provide the most comprehensive and compelling evidence to date on Congress's influence on presidential war powers. Their findings have profound implications for contemporary debates about war, presidential power, and Congress's constitutional obligations. While devoting special attention to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this book systematically analyzes the last half-century of U.S. military policy. Among its conclusions: Presidents are systematically less likely to exercise military force when their partisan opponents retain control of Congress. The partisan composition of Congress, however, matters most for proposed deployments that are larger in size and directed at less strategically important locales. Moreover, congressional influence is often achieved not through bold legislative action but through public posturing--engaging the media, raising public concerns, and stirring domestic and international doubt about the United States' resolve to see a fight through to the end.