Preferences and Well-Being

A collection of papers by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics on the subject.

The papers collected here, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being.Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning the formulation of such a normative standard. They examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like; whether preferences are subject to requirements of rationality and what reasons we have to prefer certain things over others; and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being.