Rules and Reason

This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy and suggests possible future strategies for change.

This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy from the viewpoints of theory, systems, and applications. It suggests why changes may be desirable and how these might be implemented. Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan offers a foreword to the work and coauthors a chapter on theory of constitutional rules.Polarization in Western democracies and the collapse of centrally planned economies have led to calls for a redefinition of the state's core functions. This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy anchoring the state from the viewpoints of theory, systems, and applications. It suggests why changes may be desirable and how these might be implemented. Part I addresses the writing of constitutions, the dynamic between constitutional order and civil society, the struggle between competitive and protectionist interests, the conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution, and the role of cultural explanations of constitutional development patterns. Part II explores the interplay between electoral systems and constitutional engineering, the internal costs of political coalitions, and campaigns in pluralistic elections. Part III investigates the quest for stable, dynamic federal states with particular attention to opportunities and pitfalls in Europe. With a foreword and contributions from Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan.