Executive Decree Authority

This book offers a theory that predicts when executives should turn to decree and when legislatures should accept this method of policy-making.

Across political systems, executives increasingly take (or are given) the authority to act without concurrent legislative action. This book offers a theory of political institutions that predicts when executives should turn to decree and when legislatures should accept - or even prefer - this method of making policy.When presidents or prime ministers make law by decree, are we witnessing the usurpation of legislative authority? The increased frequency of policy-making by decree, in older democracies as well as in the newer regimes of Latin America and the post-communist world, has generated concern that legislatures are being marginalized and thus that democratic institutions are not functioning. Professors Carey and Shugart suggest which elements of constitutional design should (and should not) foster reliance on decree authority. Individual chapters then bring the experiences of Argentina, Brazil, France, Italy, Peru, Russia, the United States, and Venezuela to bear on the theory. The book combines broadly comparative analysis with intensive case studies to provide a more thorough understanding of the scope of executive authority across countries.