Making and Breaking Governments
Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies
Michael Laver editor Kenneth A Shepsle editor
Format:Hardback
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
Published:26th Jan '96
Currently unavailable, and unfortunately no date known when it will be back
This hardback is available in another edition too:
- Paperback£29.99(9780521438360)
Making and Breaking Governments theorizes on how parties create, maintain, or replace new governments.
Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical model of how parties create and then maintain or replace new governments. The theory involves strategic interaction and its consequences, then tests empirical hypotheses with data drawn from postwar European parliamentary democracies.Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.
"Laver and Shepsle have produced an expertly executed manuscript that will have a profound effect on the study of government coalitions for years to come....their focus on agenda powers is seminal, provocative, and profound." Kaare Strom, Legislative Studies Quarterly
"...at once eminently testable and refreshingly simple and elegant." American Political Science Review
"Laver and Shepsle creatively combine the components of political theory with vigorous multivirate statistical analysis, case studies of Germany and Ireland, and simulation experiments to differentiate between cabinet and legislative governing responsibilities." Craig A. Williams, LSS Newsletter
"...clear and persuasive.... ...a well-articulated conception of parliamentary government and one that is likely to stimulate much further research. ...Making and Breaking Governments...will powerfully stimulate and enhance future research on democratic political institutions." Kaare Strom, Legislative Studies Quarterly
"The authors have achieved a brilliant juxtaposition of theoretical rigor with practical application. Theorists, as well as commentators on political elections, can profitably use this book. It is well worth an analyst's time and effort to learn this model for applications to their respective parliaments." Douglas Wills, Public Choice
- Winner of American Political Science Association Prize.
ISBN: 9780521432450
Dimensions: 235mm x 155mm x 23mm
Weight: 539g
316 pages