Equality for Inegalitarians

This book provides an alternative account of distributive justice on the view that all persons are moral equals.

Taking an original look at the relations between choice, talent, desert and responsibility, Sher offers a compelling alternative account of distributive justice to luck egalitarianism, discussing basic questions about moral and distributive equality. Of interest to students and academics interested in debates surrounding luck egalitarianism and distributive justice.This book offers a new and compelling account of distributive justice and its relation to choice. Unlike luck egalitarians, who treat unchosen differences in people's circumstances as sources of unjust inequality to be overcome, Sher views such differences as pervasive and unavoidable features of the human situation. Appealing to an original account of what makes us moral equals, he argues that our interest in successfully negotiating life's ever-shifting contingencies is more basic than our interest in achieving any more specific goals. He argues, also, that the state's obligation to promote this interest supports a principled version of the view that what matters about resources, opportunity, and other secondary goods is only that each person have enough. The book opens up a variety of new questions, and offers a distinctive new perspective for scholars of political theory and political philosophy, and for those interested in distributive justice and luck egalitarianism.