Leibniz' Doctrine of Necessary Truth

This insightful exploration of necessary truths examines Leibniz's doctrine and its philosophical implications, providing a critical analysis of his ideas and their relevance today.

Originally published in 1990, Leibniz' Doctrine of Necessary Truth delves into the doctrine of necessity, which posits that necessary truths can be derived from the principle of identity through the substitution of definitions. The book explores this concept in detail, relating it to the views of notable philosophic predecessors and contemporaries. It provides a comprehensive examination of how Leibniz's ideas connect with those of Aristotle, Hobbes, and others, enriching the reader's understanding of the philosophical landscape surrounding necessary truths.

The author contextualizes the doctrine within the broader philosophical discussions of the time, particularly during the 1960s when interest in Leibniz was on the rise. The first section of Leibniz' Doctrine of Necessary Truth considers the perspectives of earlier thinkers, setting the stage for a deeper analysis of Leibniz's contributions. The second section highlights the tension between reductionistic and formalistic views championed by Leibniz and the intuitionism and anti-reductionism presented by philosophers like Descartes and Locke.

In the concluding chapters, the author critically assesses Leibniz's arguments against the positions held by Hobbes and Locke, culminating in a discussion that clarifies the distinctions between necessary and contingent truths. This thorough examination not only sheds light on Leibniz's doctrine but also invites readers to reflect on the implications of necessity in philosophical thought.