The Epistemology of Disagreement

This collection features twelve philosophers examining the epistemic implications of disagreement, addressing key questions about belief revision, philosophical discourse, and the significance of independent disagreements in understanding epistemic phenomena.

The Epistemology of Disagreement is a comprehensive examination of the epistemic implications of disagreement, featuring contributions from twelve philosophers who delve into various responses to the challenges it presents for philosophical inquiry. This collection of essays aims to enhance our understanding of key epistemic phenomena that arise when engaging with differing beliefs. Most essays are newly written, providing fresh perspectives on this complex topic.

The contributors explore critical questions surrounding the nature of disagreement, such as when, if ever, an individual's disagreement with others should prompt a reassessment of their own beliefs. The book addresses the viability of conciliatory approaches, which advocate for significant belief revision in light of disagreement, while also considering the self-defeating nature of these views given the existing disagreements about how to handle disagreement. Additionally, the essays touch on the specific implications of philosophical disagreements and how they relate to broader epistemological theories.

Notable philosophers like John Hawthorne, Amia Srinivasan, and Thomas Kelly present arguments both in favor of and against conciliatory views, while David Christensen and Stewart Cohen offer contrasting perspectives. Other contributors, including Bryan Frances and Sanford Goldberg, focus on philosophical disagreements that resonate with many readers. Through this diverse array of voices, the book enriches the discourse on disagreement, providing valuable insights for both seasoned scholars and those new to the topic, ultimately fostering a deeper understanding of the epistemic challenges posed by differing beliefs.