Quine versus Davidson

This book explores key philosophical issues in language through a comparative analysis of Quine and Davidson, highlighting their differing views on methodological naturalism, truth, and reference in language and meaning.

In Quine versus Davidson, Gary Kemp delves into the intricate landscape of language philosophy through a comparative analysis of two prominent figures from the late twentieth century: Willard Van Orman Quine and Donald Davidson. While both philosophers are often seen as aligned in their views on language and meaning, Kemp uncovers significant tensions that challenge this perception. He highlights the nuanced disagreements between Quine and Davidson, particularly emphasizing their differing commitments to methodological naturalism.

Kemp argues that Quine's foundational belief in methodological naturalism fundamentally clashes with Davidson's approach. While Davidson's thought experiment of Radical Interpretation appears to build on Quinean principles, Kemp suggests that Quine's philosophical outlook rejects the roles of truth and reference that Davidson employs. From Quine's perspective, Davidson's use of truth is overly ambitious, and his reliance on reference is mired in unscientific intuition. Conversely, Davidson critiques Quine's stance as excessively scientistic, overlooking the complexities inherent in language and meaning.

Ultimately, Kemp advocates for Quine's methodology, presenting a compelling case for naturalized epistemology as a means to understand language and meaning coherently. He posits that it is possible to construct a consistent account of these concepts without resorting to the contentious notions of truth and reference. Through this exploration, Kemp not only sheds light on the philosophical divide between Quine and Davidson but also enriches the discourse on the nature of language itself.