The Inessential Indexical

Cappelen and Dever challenge the belief that perspective, especially first-person perspective, holds significant philosophical weight, arguing instead that it is an illusion without essential indexicality or self-locating attitudes.

The Inessential Indexical by Cappelen and Dever presents a compelling argument against the widely held belief that perspective, particularly the first-person perspective, holds significant philosophical depth. The authors contend that rather than requiring alternative explanations for indexical and perspectival phenomena, the entire discussion surrounding these concepts is fundamentally an illusion. They challenge the notion that our linguistic and cognitive representations of the world—such as stating that a meeting is taking place now or that a tree appears larger from one viewpoint than another—are rooted in anything philosophically substantial.

Cappelen and Dever specifically critique the prevailing view in contemporary philosophy that emphasizes the importance of perspective, especially in the realms of language and mind. They argue against concepts such as essential indexicality and self-locating attitudes, maintaining that these ideas do not reveal any inherent philosophical truths. Instead, they propose that the focus on these perspectives is misguided and that the phenomena themselves do not require a deeper philosophical inquiry. Their work seeks to dismantle the entrenched belief that understanding perspective is crucial across various philosophical domains.

The book is part of the Context and Content series, which aims to highlight significant research at the crossroads of philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science. Under the guidance of general editor François Recanati, The Inessential Indexical invites readers to reconsider their assumptions about perspective and its role in philosophical discourse, ultimately suggesting that much of the debate surrounding it may be unfounded.