Hume, Passion, and Action
Format:Hardback
Publisher:Oxford University Press
Published:21st Jun '18
Currently unavailable, and unfortunately no date known when it will be back
David Hume's theory of action is well known for several provocative theses, including that passion and reason cannot be opposed over the direction of action. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe defends an original interpretation of Hume's views on passion, reason, and motivation which is consistent with other theses in Hume's philosophy, loyal to his texts, and historically situated. She challenges the now orthodox interpretation of Hume on motivation, presenting an alternative that situates Hume closer to "Humeans" than many recent interpreters have. Part of the strategy is to examine the thinking of the early modern intellectuals to whom Hume responds. Most of these thinkers insisted that passions lead us to pursue harmful objects unless regulated by reason; and most regarded passions as representations of good and evil, which can be false. Understanding Hume's response to these claims requires appreciating his respective characterizations of reason and passion. The author argues that Hume's thesis that reason is practically impotent apart from passion is about beliefs generated by reason, rather than about the capacity of reason. Furthermore, the argument makes sense of Hume's sometimes-ridiculed description of passions as "original existences" having no reference to objects. The author also shows how Hume understood morality as intrinsically motivating, while holding that moral beliefs are not themselves motives, and why he thought of passions as self-regulating, contrary to the admonitions of the rationalists.
Recommended. * M. G. Spencer, CHOICE *
a detailed, textually sensitive, historically grounded, and exhaustively researched work seeking to prove that the traditional interpretation has decisive textual support and internal coherence. Not all opponents will be persuaded, but the book gives all scholars much to admire and plenty to chew on. . . . Radcliffe examines . . . central interpretive issues from all sides and addresses many dissenting interpretations with care and fairness. There is insight on every page. The rewards of every chapter, for anyone interested in Hume's psychology or metaethics, extend far beyond anything I can address here. * Rachel Cohon, Philosophical Review *
Elizabeth Radcliffe's book is an important and original contribution to scholarship on Hume's ethics and moral psychology. Throughout, she deftly combines important discussions of Hume's predecessors and contemporaries that serve to contextualize his views with in-depth analysis of Hume's texts...she shows an impressive familiarity with more recent scholarship on Hume's and Humean ethics, and deploys much of this recent scholarship to frame her own interpretation of Hume's ethics and moral psychology...sophisticated and nuanced. * Jacqueline Taylor, University of San Francisco, Journal of the History of Philosophy *
Reading Radcliffe's book is an excellent reminder of how far the history of philosophy has matured in the last fifty years. It is also an object lesson in the philosophical value of such study. As with evolution, later does not always mean better, and few moral philosophers or moral psychologists can afford to ignore the riches work such as hers unveils. For scholars of Hume, and of his seventeenth and eighteenth century context, it will be indispensable. * Simon Blackburn, Notre Dame Philosophical Review *
ISBN: 9780199573295
Dimensions: 242mm x 163mm x 23mm
Weight: 538g
244 pages