Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism

Answering the Question of Justification

Robert Stern author

Format:Paperback

Publisher:Oxford University Press

Published:15th Jul '04

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Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism cover

Robert Stern investigates how scepticism can be countered by using transcendental arguments concerning the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, language, or thought. He shows that the most damaging sceptical questions concern neither the certainty of our beliefs, nor the reliability of our belief-forming methods, but rather whether we can justify our beliefs in the light of our doxastic norms. He concludes that although transcendental arguments cannot be used to resolve the first two issues, they can help to address the issue of normative justification as raised by our belief in the existence of the external world, causal necessity, and other minds. Stern then reassesses transcendental arguments of the sort proposed by Kant in the Refutation of Idealism and the Second Analogy, by Hegel in his treatment of perception in the Phenomenology, and by Strawson in Individuals. Readable, well-informed, and original, Stern's discussion will provide a positive stimulus for further discussion of the philosophical and interpretative issues raised by this influential approach to the problem of scepticism.

Review from previous edition Buy this book and a crate of wine, and work carefully through both of them in the company of a few like-minded colleagues. * T.E. Wilkerson, Mind *
Stern presents this very dense and complex material carefully, patiently and clearly ... and as he systematically winnows the strategic wheat from the chaff, he narrows the focus of the enquiry ... Chapter four contains an excellent and very thorough discussion of Kant's idealism. * T.E. Wilkerson, Mind *

ISBN: 9780199261574

Dimensions: 217mm x 138mm x 16mm

Weight: 341g

272 pages