Aristotle on the Apparent Good

Jessica Moss's Aristotle on the Apparent Good explores the role of imagination in Aristotle's moral psychology, emphasizing pleasure's significance in ethical understanding.

In Aristotle on the Apparent Good, Jessica Moss offers a thought-provoking exploration of Aristotle's moral psychology, emphasizing the significance of phantasia, or imagination, in our perception of goodness. She posits that our understanding of what appears good is deeply rooted in psychological phenomena that resemble perception, challenging traditional interpretations that prioritize reason in ethical considerations. By examining how pleasure is perceived as inherently good, Moss invites readers to rethink the foundations of desire and action within Aristotelian ethics.

Moss's analysis begins with Aristotle's comparison of appearances of goodness to ordinary perceptual experiences, such as optical illusions. This perspective allows her to argue that our perceptions of goodness operate similarly to our visual experiences, governed by a psychological capacity that influences our desires. By framing ethical understanding through the lens of phantasia, she sheds light on critical aspects of Aristotle's philosophy, including emotions, ethical habituation, and the interplay between perception and thought.

Ultimately, Aristotle on the Apparent Good presents a compelling reinterpretation of Aristotle's moral framework. Moss's work not only challenges the conventional emphasis on reason but also elevates the role of pleasure in ethical discourse. Her insights pave the way for a deeper understanding of how appearances of goodness shape our motivations and ethical decisions, making this book an essential read for anyone interested in moral philosophy and Aristotle's enduring legacy.