Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy

This book explores the deep-rooted debate between impartialists and their critics in moral and political philosophy, arguing for a resolution that prioritizes justice while acknowledging the significance of partial concerns.

In "Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy," the author explores the longstanding debate between impartialists and their critics, a discussion that has shaped moral and political philosophy for over a decade. Impartialists contend that any reasonable interpretation of impartiality can incorporate the personal concerns we hold for others. In contrast, partialists argue that this integration is impossible, asserting that impartialist frameworks ultimately require the sidelining of the meaningful commitments that enrich our lives.

The book delves into the depths of this philosophical disagreement, asserting that while the divide is profound, it is not insurmountable. The author proposes that a resolution can be found by examining how impartialist political philosophy can prioritize justice, particularly when it clashes with individuals' personal conceptions of the good. This exploration leads to the argument that the defense of political impartialism hinges on a moral foundation that does not rest on the ideal of equality, as commonly believed, but rather on the partial concerns we have for one another.

Ultimately, the author argues that for impartialist moral philosophy to resonate and gain support, it must place our partial concerns at its core. By doing so, it can establish a robust defense of political impartialism that recognizes the necessity of prioritizing justice while also acknowledging the enduring nature of pluralism regarding conceptions of the good. This nuanced approach offers a fresh perspective on the intersection of impartiality, justice, and personal commitments in moral and political thought.