Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra's Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles argues against the trivial interpretation of a key philosophical principle, providing robust support for its validity.

In Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra explores the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, which posits that no two concrete objects can differ solely in numerical terms. The author presents a compelling case against the trivial interpretation of this principle, arguing that it cannot be reduced to mere triviality. He emphasizes that the common understanding of the principle is consistent with scenarios where objects only vary numerically, thus challenging its validity.

Rodriguez-Pereyra offers two significant arguments in support of the principle. The first argument draws from broadly Humean considerations that eliminate a specific kind of necessary connection between distinct entities. The second argument delves into the foundational aspects of how objects possess certain properties, providing a deeper philosophical context to the discussion. Additionally, the book critiques restricted versions of the principle, which claim that no two objects can be purely qualitatively indiscernible.

The author further extends his analysis to abstract objects, suggesting that the arguments supporting the weakest version of the principle are applicable beyond just concrete entities. Ultimately, Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles concludes with the assertion that no objects, whether abstract or concrete, can exist that differ only numerically, challenging longstanding notions in metaphysics and encouraging readers to reconsider their understanding of identity and difference.