U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition

Banks Miller author Brett Curry author

Format:Hardback

Publisher:Oxford University Press Inc

Published:21st Feb '19

Currently unavailable, and unfortunately no date known when it will be back

U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition cover

United States Attorneys (USAs), the chief federal prosecutors in each judicial district, are key in determining how the federal government uses coercive force against its citizens. How much control do national political actors exert over the prosecutorial decisions of USAs? This book investigates this question using a unique dataset of federal criminal prosecutions between 1986 and 2015 that captures both decisions by USAs to file cases as well as the sentences that result. Utilizing intuitions from principal-agent theory, work on the career ambition of bureaucrats and politicians, and selected case-studies, the authors develop and advance a set of hypotheses about control by the President and Congress. Harnessing variation across time, federal judicial districts, and five legal issue areas - immigration, narcotics, terrorism, weapons, and white-collar crime - Miller and Curry find that USAs are subject to considerable executive influence in their decision making, supporting findings about the increase of presidential power over the last three decades. In addition, they show that the ability of the President to appoint USAs to higher-level positions within the executive branch or to federal judgeships is an important mechanism of that control. This investigation sheds light on how the need to be responsive to popularly-elected principals channels the enormous prosecutorial discretion of USAs.

United States Attorneys * whose offices play pivotal roles in deciding how federal criminal statutes get used and against whomare politically accountable to the president but operationally embedded in their districts. They also have their own preferences and political ambitions. How do all these factors affect their enforcement priorities? Banks Miller and Brett Curry's terrific book goes beyond vague speculation and dives into the data with a rigor and nuance that will make this book mandatory reading for law and political science scholars, indeed anyone seeking to understand variation within the federal criminal justice system. Whether one celebrates U.S. Attorney offices as bastions of independence or worries about the management challenge they present to political leaders in Washington, the timeliness of this insightful book cannot be denied." -Daniel Richman, Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia Law School *
This is an important work demonstrating that presidents secure significant influence through the implementation of their appointment power. In a comprehensive study, employing principal * agent theory, case studies, and data spanning three decades of district-level activity by U.S. Attorneys over multiple issue areas, the authors also provide insights on the influence of Congress and court decisions. As such, this is a must read book for students and researchers who seek to understand the dynamics of our separation of powers system. It also provides new evidence on the motivations and career objectives of U.S. Attorneys. A solid contribution to the literature." -Richard W. Waterman, Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky *
In U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition, Miller and Curry provide an intriguing account of these important and highly understudied government actors. They address theoretically interesting dynamics regarding the office that involve fundamental themes of political science scholarship. Professors teaching graduate and undergraduate classes on law and courts should incorporate materials such as this as part of their required readings." -Jeffrey L. Yates, Professor of Political Science, Binghamton University

ISBN: 9780190928247

Dimensions: 156mm x 234mm x 14mm

Weight: 485g

224 pages